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Abstract
We study abstract versions of Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem
and formulate generalizations of Lo¨b’s derivability conditions that work
for logics weaker than the classical one. We isolate the role of contraction
rule in Go¨del’s theorem and give a (toy) example of a system based on
modal logic without contraction invalidating Go¨del’s argument.
1 Introduction
One of the topics that have been fascinating logicians over the years is Go¨del’s
second incompleteness theorem (G2). Both mathematically and philosophically
G2 is well known to be more problematic than his first incompleteness theorem
(G1). G1 and Rosser’s Theorem are well understood in the context of recursion
theory. Abstract logic-free formulations have been given by Kleene [12] (‘sym-
metric form’), Smullyan [20] (‘representation systems’) and others. Sometimes
G2 is considered as a minor addition to G1, whose role is to exhibit a specific
form of the sentence independent from a given theory, namely its consistency as-
sertion. However, starting with the work of Kreisel, Orey, Feferman, and others,
who provided various nontrivial uses of G2, it has been gradually understood
that the two results are of a rather different nature and scope. G2 has more
to do with the (modal-logical) properties of the provability predicate and the
phenomenon of self-reference in sufficiently expressive systems. A satisfactory
general mathematical context for G2, however, still seems to be lacking.
The main difficulties in G2 are due to the fact that we cannot easily delineate
a class of formulas that ‘mean’ consistency. Thus, the most intuitively appealing
formulation of G2 — sufficiently strong consistent theories cannot prove their
own consistency — remains non-mathematical. For a concrete formal system,
such as Peano arithmetic PA, one can usually write out a specific ‘natural’
formula ConPA and declare it to be the expression of consistency. This approach
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is rather common in mathematics but has several deficiencies: Firstly, it ties the
statement to a very particular formula, coding mechanism etc., and provides
no clue why this choice is better than the other ones. Secondly, instead of a
general theorem working uniformly for a wide class of theories, we only obtain
a specific statement for an individual theory such as PA. We do not know what
is the natural consistency assertion for an arbitrary extension of PA. Thus, we
have a problem with translating our informal intuition into strict mathematical
terms.
The way to better understand G2 is through investigating its range and gen-
eralizations. A lucky circumstance is that G2 also holds for larger syntactically
defined classes of consistency formulas, some of which are apparently intension-
ally correct (adequately express consistency), but some are not. Thus, it is still
possible to formulate mathematical results in certain important aspects more
(rather than less) general than the broad intuitive formulation of G2 above.
A universally accepted approach to general formulations of G2 appeared in
the fundamental paper by Feferman [3] who showed, among other things, that
G2 holds for all consistency assertions defined by Σ1-numerations. Feferman
deals with first-order theories T in the language containing that of PA and spec-
ified by recursively enumerable (r.e.) sets of axioms. Feferman assumes fixed
some natural Go¨del numbering of the syntax of T as well as some specific ax-
iomatization of first order logic. A Σ1-formula α(x) defining the set of Go¨del
numbers of axioms of T in the standard model of PA is called a Σ1-numeration
of T .1 It determines the provability formula Provα(x) and the corresponding
consistency assertion Conα. Feferman’s statement of G2 is that for all consis-
tent theories T given by Σ1-numerations α and containing a sufficiently strong
fragment of PA, the formula Conα is unprovable in T .
This theorem is considerably more general than any specific instance of G2
for an individual theory T . However, it also presupposes quite a lot: first order
logic and its axiomatization, Go¨del numbering, the way formula Provα is built
from α.
Exploring bounds to G2 leads to relaxing various assumptions involved in
Feferman’s statement:
• One can weaken the axioms of arithmetic (for a representative selection see
Bezboruah–Shepherdson [2], Pudla´k [14], Wilkie–Paris [24], Adamowicz–
Zdanowski [1], Willard [25, 26]).
• One can consider theories modulo interpretability. This approach started
with the work of Feferman [3]. In the recent years it lead to particularly
attractive coding-free formulations of generalizations of G2 due to Harvey
Friedman and Albert Visser (see [21, 22, 23]).
• One can weaken the requirements on the proof predicate aka derivability
conditions (see Feferman [3], Lo¨b [13], Jeroslow [10, 11]).
• One can weaken the logic.
1Feferman deals with the notion of r.e. formula rather than with the equivalent notion of
Σ1-formula more common today.
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It is the latter two aspects, less studied in the literature, that we are going to
comment on in this note. Firstly, let us briefly recall the history of derivability
conditions.
Go¨del [5] gave a sketch of a proof of G2 and a promise to provide full details
in a subsequent publication. This promise has not been fulfilled, and a detailed
proof of this theorem — for a system Z related to first-order arithmetic PA —
only appeared in a monograph by Hilbert and Bernays [9]. In order to structure
a rather lengthy proof Hilbert and Bernays formulated certain conditions on
the proof predicate in Z, sufficient for the proof of G2. Later Martin Lo¨b [13]
gave an elegant form to these conditions by stating them fully in terms of the
provability predicate Pr(x) and obtained an important strengthening of G2
known as Lo¨b’s Theorem. Essentially the same properties of the provability
predicate were earlier noted by Go¨del in his note [6], where he proposed to
treat the provability predicate as a connective  in modal logic, though the
idea that these conditions constitute necessary requirements on a provability
predicate most likely only appeared later. For the sake of brevity we call the
Go¨del–Hilbert–Bernays–Lo¨b conditions simply Lo¨b’s conditions below.
A traditional proof of G2 (for arithmetical theories) consists of a deriva-
tion of G2 from the fixed point lemma using Lo¨b’s conditions (see e.g. [17]).
An accurate justification of these conditions is technically not so easy, and a
rare textbook provides enough details here, however see Smoryn´ski [19] and
Rautenberg [15] for readable expositions.
Lo¨b’s conditions are applicable to formal theories at least containing the
connective of implication and closed under the modus ponens rule. Here we
give more general abstract formulations of G2 which presuppose very little
about logic. They are rather close in the spirit and the level of generality
to the recursion-theoretic formulations of G1 due to Smullyan. When a good
implication is added to the language one essentially obtains the familiar Lo¨b’s
conditions. However, we show that Go¨del’s argument presupposes admissibility
of the contraction rule restricted to -formulas in the logic under consideration.
Moreover, the uniqueness of Go¨delian fixed point is based on the similarly
restricted form of weakening.
In the last part of the paper we present a system invalidating a formalized
version of G2. We consider a version of propositional modal logic K4 based on
the contraction-free fragment of classical logic extended by fixed point operators
(defined for any formulas modalized in the fixed point variables). By means of
a cut-elimination theorem for this system we establish the failure of G2 and
some other properties such as the infinity of the Go¨delian and Henkinian fixed
points.
2 Abstract provability structures
Definition 2.1. Let us call an abstract consequence relation a structure S =
(LS ,6S ,⊤,⊥), where LS is a set of sentences of S, 6S is a transitive reflexive
relation on LS, ⊤ and ⊥ are distinguished elements of LS (‘axiom’ and ‘contra-
diction’). A sentence x ∈ LS is called provable in S, if ⊤ 6S x, and refutable in
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S, if x 6S ⊥. Sentences x, y are called equivalent in S, if x 6S y and y 6S x.
The equivalence of x and y will be denoted x =S y.
The structure S represents syntactical (rather than semantical) data about
the theory in question. In a typical case, for example, for arithmetical theories
S, the relation x 6S y denotes the provability of y from hypothesis x, whereas
⊤ and ⊥ are some standard provable and refutable formulas, respectively, e.g.,
0 = 0 and 0 6= 0.
In concrete situations we can enrich this structure by additional data, for
example, by the conjunction and the implication connectives. Notice that we
do not assume either ⊥ 6S x or x 6S ⊤, nor do we assume the existence of any
logical connectives (such as negation) in S.
S is called inconsistent if ⊤ 6S ⊥, otherwise it is called consistent. By
transitivity, if S is consistent then no sentence is both provable and refutable.
S is called complete if every x ∈ LS is either provable or refutable. S is called
r.e., if LS is recursive and 6S is r.e. (as a binary relation). T is called an
extension of S if LT = LS and 6S is contained in 6T .
Let PS and RS denote the sets of provable and of refutable sentences of S,
respectively. If S is consistent and r.e., then PS and RS is a pair of disjoint
r.e. sets. We say that S separates pairs of disjoint r.e. sets if for each such pair
(A,B) there is a total computable function f such that
∀n ∈ A f(n) ∈ PS and ∀n ∈ B f(n) ∈ RS .
The following statement is a natural version of G1 and Rosser’s theorem
for abstract consequence relations (a´ la Kleene and Smullyan); we omit the
standard proof.
Proposition 2.2. (i) If S is r.e., consistent and complete, then both PS and
RS are decidable.
(ii) If S is r.e. and separates disjoint pairs of r.e. sets, then every consistent
extension of S is incomplete and undecidable.
Next we introduce two operators ,⊠ : LS → LS representing provability
and refutability predicates in S.
Definition 2.3. Provability and refutability operators for an abstract conse-
quence relation S are functions ,⊠ : LS → LS satisfying the following condi-
tions, for all x, y ∈ LS:
C1. x 6S y ⇒ x 6S y, ⊠y 6 ⊠x.
C2. ⊤ 6S ⊠⊥;
C3. x 6S y, x 6S ⊠y ⇒ x 6S ⊠⊤;
C4. ⊠x 6S ⊠ x.
The algebra (LS ,6S ,⊤,⊥,,⊠) is called an abstract provability structure
(APS).
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Intuitively, x is the sentence expressing the provability of a sentence x,
whereas ⊠x expresses its refutability in S. Condition C1 means that provability
of y follows from provability of x whenever y is derivable from x; similarly,
refutability of y implies refutability of x. Conditions C2 and C3 are axioms for
contradiction: according to C2, refutability of ⊥ is provable in S; according to
C3, ⊤ is refutable if some sentence y is both provable and refutable. Finally,
Condition 4 means that the refutability of x can be formally checked in S. It
is an analogue of Lo¨b’s condition L2 (see below).
Note that we consider the refutability operator on a par with the provability
operator, since we do not assume that the logic of S necessarily has a well-
defined operation of negation, that is, we cannot always define ⊠x as ¬x.
Remark 2.4. It is rather natural to additionally require that ⊥ =S ⊠⊤:
refutability of ⊤ and provability of ⊥ are expressed by the same statement
⊤ 6S ⊥. Yet, it is not, strictly speaking, needed in this very abstract context,
and we take ⊠⊤ as our default expression of inconsistency.
Definition 2.5. We say that an abstract provability structure S has a Go¨delian
fixed point if there is a sentence p ∈ LS such that p =S ⊠p.
Notice that Go¨del considered a dual sentence q expressing its own unprov-
ability in S. R. Jeroslow [11] noticed that the sentence stating its own refutabil-
ity allows to prove G2 under somewhat more general conditions than those of
Lo¨b. In our formalism the sentence q is not expressible, therefore we are using
Jeroslow’s idea.
A very abstract version of G2 can now be stated as follows.
Theorem 1. Suppose an APS S has a Go¨delian fixed point.
(i) If S is consistent, then ⊠⊤ is irrefutable in S.
(ii) ⊠⊠⊤ 6S ⊠⊤, that is, Statement (i) is formalizable in S.
Proof. Let p =S ⊠p. First we prove Statement (ii) omitting the subscript S
everywhere:
1. ⊠p 6 ⊠ p 6 p by C4 and C1;
2. p = ⊠p 6 ⊠⊤ by C3 (since ⊠p 6 ⊠p);
3. ⊠⊠⊤ 6 ⊠p = p 6 ⊠⊤ by C1.
Proof of Statement (i): Assume ⊠⊤ 6 ⊥. By the previous argument p 6
⊠⊤, hence p 6 ⊥. By C1, ⊠⊥ 6 ⊠p = p 6 ⊥. Therefore, by C2, ⊤ 6 ⊠⊥ 6
⊥.
The following statement shows that under some additional condition the
Go¨delian–Jeroslowian fixed point is unique modulo equivalence in S and coin-
cides with the inconsistency assertion for S. Therefore, the existence of such a
fixed point is not only sufficient but also necessary for the validity of (a formal-
ized version of) G2. The additional condition is
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C5. x 6S ⊤, for all x ∈ LS .
Theorem 2. Assume C5 holds for S. Then p =S ⊠⊤ for all Go¨delian fixed
points p and (if such a sentence exists)
⊠⊠⊤ =S ⊠⊤.
Proof. We know that p 6 ⊠⊤. Since p = ⊠p 6 ⊤ we obtain ⊠⊤ 6 ⊠p = p.
Hence p = ⊠⊤ and therefore ⊠⊠⊤ = ⊠⊤.
3 Consequence relations with implication
Classical Lo¨b’s conditions emerge for APS with an implication. A decent im-
plication can be defined for consequence relations representing derivability of a
sentence from a (multi)set of assumptions. In other words, we now go to a more
general but less symmetric format Γ ⊢ ϕ, where Γ is a finite multiset and ϕ an
element of a given set L. In order to avoid confusion we use the more standard
notation ⊢ instead of 6 and will follow the standard conventions of sequential
proof format. In particular, Γ, ϕ denotes the result of adjoining ϕ ∈ LS to a
multiset of sentences Γ, and Γ,∆ denotes the multiset union of Γ and ∆.2
Definition 3.1. A consequence relation with an implication on L is a structure
S = (LS ,⊢,→,⊤,⊥) where ⊢ is a binary relation between finite multisets of
elements of LS and elements of LS ; → is a binary operation on L; ⊤ and ⊥ are
distinguished elements of L such that the following conditions hold:
I1. ϕ ⊢ ϕ;
I2. if Γ, ψ ⊢ ϕ and ∆ ⊢ ψ then Γ,∆ ⊢ ϕ;
I3. Γ, ϕ ⊢ ψ ⇐⇒ Γ ⊢ ϕ→ ψ;
I4. Γ,⊤ ⊢ ϕ ⇐⇒ Γ ⊢ ϕ.
Notice that Conditions I1 and I2 generalize reflexivity and transitivity of 6.
Setting ϕ 6S ψ as ϕ ⊢ ψ yields an abstract consequence relation in the sense
of Definition 2.1. Condition I3 speaks for itself. Condition I4 conveniently
stipulates that provability from the empty multiset of assumptions is the same
as provability from ⊤. It also implies ⊤ → ⊥ =S ⊥.
Similarly to the implication one can consider consequence relations with
other additional connectives of which we are mostly interested in conjunction.
Definition 3.2. Conjunction is a binary operator ⊗ : L2S → LS satisfying
Γ, ϕ, ψ ⊢ θ ⇐⇒ Γ, ϕ⊗ ψ ⊢ θ.
2Our strive for generality does not go as far as to consider lists of formulas rather than
multisets.
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If conjunction is available, then ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ⊢ ψ holds in S if and only if
ϕ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ϕn ⊢ ψ. Hence, in the presence of conjunction in S the relation 6S
uniquely determines the corresponding multiset consequence relation Γ ⊢ ϕ.
For consequence relations with an implication we can define negation ¬ϕ by
ϕ → ⊥. The following simple lemma shows that the implication respects the
deductive equivalence relation in S and the negation satisfies the contraposition
principle.
Lemma 3.3. (i) If Γ ⊢ ϕ→ ψ and ∆ ⊢ ϕ, then Γ,∆ ⊢ ψ;
(ii) ϕ1 =S ϕ2 and ψ1 =S ψ2 implies (ϕ1 → ψ1) =S (ϕ2 → ψ2);
(iii) Γ, ϕ ⊢ ψ implies Γ,¬ψ ⊢ ¬ϕ.
Next we turn to the derivability conditions. Assume S is a consequence
relation with an implication.
Definition 3.4.  : LS → LS satisfies Lo¨b’s derivability conditions for S if
L1. (ϕ→ ψ) ⊢ ϕ→ ψ;
L2. ϕ ⊢ ϕ;
L3. ⊢ ϕ implies ⊢ ϕ.
Lemma 3.5. For any consequence relation with an implication the following
statements are equivalent:
(i)  satisfies Lo¨b’s conditions for S;
(ii)  satisfies L2 and S is closed under the rule
Γ ⊢ ϕ
Γ ⊢ ϕ
;
(iii) S is closed under the rule
Γ,∆ ⊢ ϕ
Γ,∆ ⊢ ϕ
.
Remark 3.6. Notice that the last rule is formulated slightly differently from
the more standard rule for modal logic K4:
Γ,Γ ⊢ ϕ
Γ ⊢ ϕ
.
The latter has a form of built-in contraction that we are not assuming here.
It is natural to define refutability ⊠ϕ as provability of negation ¬ϕ. Notice
that since ⊥ =S ⊤ → ⊥ we have ⊠⊤ =S ⊥, whenever L1 holds for .
However, as the example in Section 4 shows, this translation does not always
yield an APS in the sense of Definition 2.3. To sort things out we need to
consider two additional conditions on the consequence relation.
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Definition 3.7. A consequence relation with an implication
- satisfies contraction if Γ, ϕ, ϕ ⊢ ψ implies Γ, ϕ ⊢ ψ;
- satisfies weakening if Γ ⊢ ψ implies Γ, ϕ ⊢ ψ, for any ϕ.
The first condition intuitively means that any hypothesis can be used several
times in a derivation. Recall that for Girard’s linear logic this condition is not
met, however it is postulated, for example, for relevant logics. It turns out that
a certain amount of contraction is essential for the proof of G2.
The second condition corresponds to the requirement x 6S ⊤ that was
needed to guarantee that ⊠⊤ is a Go¨delian fixed point and that such a fixed
point is unique.
For consequence relations with an implication we have the following propo-
sition.
Proposition 3.8. Suppose S satisfies contraction,  : LS → LS satisfies Lo¨b’s
conditions for S and ⊠ϕ := (ϕ→ ⊥). Then (LS ,6S ,,⊠,⊤,⊥) is an APS.
Proof. By Lemma 3.3 ϕ ⊢ ψ implies ¬ψ ⊢ ¬ϕ. This yields Conditions C1 and
C4. Condition C2 obviously follows from Condition 1 for a good consequence
relation. Let us prove C3. By Lemma 3.3(i) we have: ϕ,¬ϕ,⊤ ⊢ ⊥. Hence,
ϕ,¬ϕ ⊢ ⊤ → ⊥, therefore ϕ,¬ϕ ⊢ ¬⊤ by Condition 1. The rules of
transitivity and contraction imply that, if Γ ⊢ ϕ and Γ ⊢ ¬ϕ, then Γ ⊢
¬⊤.
Thus, from Proposition 3.8 we obtain the following expected corollary, par-
allel to Theorem 1, for consequence relations satisfying contraction.
Theorem 3. Suppose S satisfies contraction and  satisfies Lo¨b’s conditions
for S. Then Theorem 1 holds for S.
For an analogue of Theorem 2 on the uniqueness of a Go¨delian fixed point
we also need a weakening property.
Theorem 4. Suppose S satisfies contraction and weakening and  satisfies
Lo¨b’s conditions for S. Then all Go¨delian fixed points in S (if exist) are equiv-
alent to ⊠⊤ =S ⊥.
Remark 3.9. As it turns out, contraction and weakening for S, though natural,
are somewhat excessive requirements for the validity of Theorems 3 and 4. A
consequence relation with an implication
- satisfies -contraction if Γ,ϕ,ϕ ⊢ ψ implies Γ,ϕ ⊢ ψ;
- satisfies -weakening if Γ ⊢ ϕ implies Γ,ψ ⊢ ϕ, for any ψ.
Conditions C3 and C5 of APS can also be weakened to
C3′. ⊠x 6S y, ⊠x 6S ⊠y ⇒ ⊠x 6S ⊠⊤;
C5′. ⊠x 6S ⊤.
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With these modifications, the proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 stay the same, which
in turn yields more general versions of Theorems 3 and 4 for consequence rela-
tions satisfying only -contraction and -weakening.
The property of -contraction actually holds for some meaningful arithmeti-
cal systems lacking general contraction rule, for example, for a version of Peano
arithmetic based on affine predicate logic considered by the second author of
this paper (as yet, unpublished).
4 A non-Go¨delian theory with fixed points
In view of Theorems 3 and 4 it is natural to ask whether the assumptions of -
contraction and -weakening are substantial for these results. More specifically,
two questions immediately present themselves:
1. Does there exist a consequence relation with an implication satisfying
Lo¨b’s conditions for  in which a Go¨delian fixed point exists, but G2
fails? (The failure of G2 can be understood in two different senses — as
a failure of its formalized version, and as a failure of its non-formalized
version. Our example will show the failure of the formalized version.)
2. Do Go¨delian fixed points in such a system S have to be unique, even if S
satisfies weakening?
In this section we provide an example showing that the answer to the first
question is positive and to the second one negative. Moreover, we formulate a
system in which there are many more fixed points than are officially required
for a proof of G2. Our system S is a version of modal logic K4 based on the
multiplicative {→,⊗,⊥} fragment of a classical logic without contraction. It
also has a built-in fixed point operator where the expression fpx.A(x) denotes
some fixed point of A(x) for formulas A modalized in the variable x. Thus, one
will be able to derive
fpx.A(x) =S A(fpx.A(x)),
for each formula A(x) modalized in x. Let us now turn to the exact definitions.
Consider the set of formulas Fm0 given by the grammar:
A ::= p | x | ⊥ | (A→ A) | A ,
where p stands for atomic propositions and x stands for variables (the alphabets
of atomic propositions and variables are disjoint). We define the set of formulas
of S by extending the set Fm0 by a new constructor: if A is a formula and all
free occurrences of x in A are within the scope of modal operators, then fpx.A
is a formula, and fpx binds all free occurrences of x. A formula B is closed if
it does not contain any free occurrences of variables. For a closed formula B,
we denote by A[B//x] the result of replacing all free occurrences of x in A by
B. We also put ¬A := A→ ⊥, ⊤ := ¬⊥ and A⊗B := ¬(A→ ¬B).
A sequent is an expression of the form Γ ⇒ ∆, where Γ and ∆ are finite
multisets of closed formulas. The sequent calculus S is defined in the standard
way by the following initial sequents and inference rules:
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Γ, A⇒ A,∆ Γ,⊥ ⇒ ∆
Γ, A[fp x.A//x]⇒ ∆
(fixL) Γ, fpx.A⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ A[fpx.A//x],∆
(fixR) Γ⇒ fpx.A,∆
Γ, B ⇒ ∆ Σ⇒ A,Π
(→L) Γ,Σ, A→ B ⇒ Π,∆
Γ, A⇒ B,∆
(→R) Γ⇒ A→ B,∆
Σ,Π⇒ A
()
Γ,Σ,Π⇒ A,∆
.
Explicitly displayed formulas in the conclusions of the rules are called principal
formulas of the corresponding inferences. In the rules (fixL), (fixR), (→L) and
(→R), the elements of Γ, ∆, Σ and Π are called side formulas. In initial sequents
and in applications of the rule (), the elements of Γ and ∆ are weakening
formulas. We call the elements of Σ and Π in the corresponding applications
of () active formulas. In addition, explicitly displayed formulas in initial
sequents are called axiomatic formulas.
A proof in S is a finite tree whose nodes are marked by sequents and leaves
are marked by initial sequents that is constructed according to the rules of the
sequent calculus. A sequent Γ⇒ ∆ is provable in S if there is a proof with the
root marked by Γ⇒ ∆.
We associate with S a consequence relation with an implication and con-
junction in the usual way by letting Γ ⊢S ϕ iff Γ ⇒ ϕ is provable in S. The
main thing we need to prove about S is the closure of S under the cut rule,
which would show that Γ ⊢S ϕ is indeed a well-defined consequence relation
(see Theorem 5 below).
Since S is cut-free, the following propositions are easy to establish. Firstly,
we obtain the failure of formalized G2.
Proposition 4.1. The sequent (⊥ → ⊥)⇒ ⊥ is not provable in S.
Recall that an inference rule is called admissible (for a given proof system)
if, for every instance of the rule, the conclusion is provable whenever all premises
are provable.
Proposition 4.2. The Lo¨b rule and the Henkin rule
A⇒ A(Lo¨b)
⇒ A
A⇒ A A⇒ A(Hen)
⇒ A
are not admissible in S.
Proof. Consider the Henkin fixed point fpx.x. The sequent ⇒ fpx.x is not
provable in S. Hence, the Henkin rule is not admissible and so is the stronger
Lo¨b rule.
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Proposition 4.3. There are infinitely many Henkinian and Go¨delian fixed
points in S.
Proof. The routine of bound variables in S is such that the formulas fpxi.xi
for graphically distinct variables xi are all inequivalent. (There is no rule of
bound variables renaming and, in fact, it is easy to convince oneself that there
are no cut-free proofs in S of the sequents fpxi.xi ⇒ fpxj.xj , for i 6= j.)
The same holds for the Go¨delian fixed points of S.
5 Cut-admissibility for S
For a proof of the cut-admissibility theorem for S we need the following standard
lemma. Let the size ‖pi‖ of a proof pi be the number of nodes in pi.
Lemma 5.1. The weakening rule
Γ⇒ ∆(weak)
Σ,Γ⇒ ∆,Π
is admissible for S, and its conclusion has a proof of at most the same size as
the premise.
Theorem 5. The cut rule
Γ⇒ ∆, A A,Σ⇒ Π
(cut) ,
Γ,Σ⇒ Π,∆
is admissible for S. Moreover, if pi1 and pi2 are proofs of the premises of (cut),
then the conclusion of (cut) has a proof with the size being less than ‖pi1‖+‖pi2‖.
Proof. Assume we have an inference
pi1
...
Γ⇒ ∆, A
pi2
...
A,Σ⇒ Π
(cut) ,
Γ,Σ⇒ Π,∆
where pi1 and pi2 are proofs in S. We proof by induction on ‖pi1‖ + ‖pi2‖ that
for any formula A there exists a proof EA(pi1, pi2) of Γ,Σ ⇒ Π,∆ with the size
being less than ‖pi1‖+ ‖pi2‖.
Consider the final inference in pi1. If the formula A is in a position of a
weakening formula in it, then we erase A in pi1 and extend the sequent Γ⇒ ∆
to Γ,Σ ⇒ Π,∆ by adding new weakening formulas. This transformation of pi1
defines EA(pi1, pi2). Moreover, we have ‖EA(pi1, pi2)‖ = ‖pi1‖ < ‖pi1‖+ ‖pi2‖.
Suppose the formula A is an axiomatic formula in the final inference of pi1.
Then the proof pi1 consists of an initial sequent and the multiset Γ has the form
Γ0, A. We obtain EA(pi1, pi2) by applying the admissible rule (weak):
pi2
...
A,Σ⇒ Π
(weak) .
Γ0, A,Σ⇒ Π,∆
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We have ‖EA(pi1, pi2)‖ 6 ‖pi2‖ < ‖pi1‖+ ‖pi2‖.
Now suppose the formula A is a side formula. Then the final inference in
pi1 can be (fixL), (fixR), (→L) or (→R).
In the case of (→R), the proof pi1 has the form
pi′1
...
Γ, B ⇒ C,∆0, A(→R) ,Γ⇒ B → C,∆0, A
where ∆ = B → C,∆0. We define EA(pi1, pi2) as
EA(pi
′
1, pi2)
...
Γ, B,Σ⇒ Π, C,∆0(→R) .Γ,Σ⇒ Π, B → C,∆0
The proof EA(pi
′
1, pi2) is defined by the induction hypothesis for pi
′
1 and pi2. We
also have ‖EA(pi1, pi2)‖ = ‖EA(pi
′
1, pi2)‖+ 1 < ‖pi
′
1‖+ ‖pi2‖+ 1 = ‖pi1‖+ ‖pi2‖.
In the case of (fixR), the proof pi1 has the form
pi′1
...
Γ⇒ B[fpx.B//x]∆0, A
(fixR) ,Γ⇒ fpx.B,∆0, A
where ∆ = fpx.B,∆0. We define EA(pi1, pi2) as
EA(pi
′
1, pi2)
...
Γ,Σ⇒ Π, B[fp x.B//p],∆0
(fixR) .Γ,Σ⇒ Π, fp x.B,∆0
The proof EA(pi
′
1, pi2) is defined by the induction hypothesis, and ‖EA(pi1, pi2)‖ =
‖EA(pi
′
1, pi2)‖+ 1 < ‖pi
′
1‖+ ‖pi2‖+ 1 = ‖pi1‖+ ‖pi2‖.
The remaining cases of (→L) and (fixL) can be analyzed analogously, so we
omit them.
Now consider the final inference in pi2. If the formula A is a weakening, an
axiomatic or a side formula in it, then we can define EA(pi1, pi2) in a similar way
to the previous cases.
Suppose that the formula A is a principal or an active formula in the final
inferences of pi1 and pi2. Then A has the form fpx.A0, A0 → A1 or A0.
If A = A0, then pi2 has one of the two forms
pi′2
...
A0,Σ1,Σ2 ⇒ D()
Σ0,A0,Σ1,Σ2 ⇒ D,Π0
pi′2
...
Σ1,A0,Σ2 ⇒ D() ,
Σ0,Σ1,A0,Σ2 ⇒ D,Π0
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where Σ = Σ0,Σ1,Σ2 and Π = D,Π0. In addition, the proof pi1 has the
form
pi′1
...
Γ1,Γ2 ⇒ A0() ,
Γ0,Γ1,Γ2 ⇒ A0,∆
where Γ = Γ0,Γ1,Γ2. If pi2 has the first form, then we define EA(pi1, pi2) as
EA0(pi
′
1, pi
′
2)
...
Γ1,Γ2,Σ1,Σ2 ⇒ D() .
Γ0,Γ1,Γ2,Σ0,Σ1,Σ2 ⇒ D,Π0,∆
We have ‖EA(pi1, pi2)‖ = ‖EA0(pi
′
1, pi
′
2)‖+ 1 < ‖pi
′
1‖+ ‖pi
′
2‖+ 1 < ‖pi1‖+ ‖pi2‖. If
pi2 has the second form, then we define EA(pi1, pi2) as
EA(f(pi1), pi
′
2)
...
Γ1,Γ2,Σ1,Σ2 ⇒ D() ,
Γ0,Γ1,Γ2,Σ0,Σ1,Σ2 ⇒ D,Π0,∆
where f(pi1) is the proof obtained by erasing multisets Γ0 and ∆ from the
conclusion of pi1. We have ‖EA(pi1, pi2)‖ = ‖EA(f(pi1), pi
′
2)‖ + 1 < ‖f(pi1)‖ +
‖pi′2‖+ 1 = ‖pi1‖+ ‖pi2‖.
In the case of A = fpx.A0, the proofs pi1 and pi2 have the form
pi′1
...
Γ⇒ ∆, A0[fpx.A0//x]
(fixR) Γ⇒ ∆, fpx.A0
pi′2
...
A0[fp x.A0//x],Σ⇒ Π
(fixL) .
fpx.A0,Σ⇒ Π
We put EA(pi1, pi2) = EA0[fpx.A0//x](pi
′
1, pi
′
2) and see that ‖EA(pi1, pi2)‖ = ‖EA0[fpx.A0//x](pi
′
1, pi
′
2)‖ <
‖pi′1‖+ ‖pi
′
2‖ < ‖pi1‖+ ‖pi2‖.
If A = A0 → A1, then the proofs pi1 and pi2 have the form
pi′1
...
A0,Γ⇒ ∆, A1(→R) Γ⇒ ∆, A0 → A1
pi′2
...
A1,Σ1 ⇒ Π1
pi′′2
...
Σ0 ⇒ Π0, A0(→L) ,Σ0, A0 → A1,Σ1 ⇒ Π0,Π1
where Σ = Σ0,Σ1 and Π = Π0,Π1. By the induction hypothesis, EA0(pi
′′
2 , pi
′
1)
is defined and ‖EA0(pi
′′
2 , pi
′
1)‖ < ‖pi
′′
2‖ + ‖pi
′
1‖. Since ‖EA0(pi
′′
2 , pi
′
1)‖ + ‖pi
′
2‖ <
‖pi′′2‖+ ‖pi
′
1‖+ ‖pi
′
2‖ < ‖pi1‖ + ‖pi2‖, then EA1(EA0(pi
′′
2 , pi
′
1), pi
′
2) is defined by the
induction hypothesis. We put EA(pi1, pi2) = EA1(EA0(pi
′′
2 , pi
′
1), pi
′
2). In addition,
we have ‖EA(pi1, pi2)‖ = ‖EA1(EA0(pi
′′
2 , pi
′
1), pi
′
2)‖ < ‖EA0(pi
′′
2 , pi
′
1)‖+‖pi
′
2‖ < ‖pi1‖+
‖pi2‖.
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6 Conclusions and future work
The preliminary results presented in this paper indicate the following conclu-
sions:
• Derivability conditions can be stated in a way not assuming much about
logic. However,
• Go¨del’s argument presupposes a certain amount of contraction for the
logic under consideration.
The role of contraction rule here is somewhat similar to its role in Liar-type
paradoxes including Russell’s paradox in set theory. Thus, Vyacheslav Grishin
(see [7, 8]) pioneered the study of set theory with full comprehension based
on a logic without contraction. He demonstrated that the pure comprehension
scheme is consistent in this logic. He also showed, however, that the extension-
ality principle allows for this system to actually prove contraction even if there
is no postulated contraction in the logic.
One can also consider systems of arithmetic based on contraction-free logic,
see e.g. Restall [16, Chapter 11]. For one such system, considered by the second
author of this paper, the rule of -contraction is admissible, which according
to our results still yields G2. Thus, we are still missing convincing examples of
mathematical theories based on weak logics for which G2 would fail.
• For consequence relations with an implication and with  satisfying Lo¨b’s
conditions, the existence of appropriately many fixed points does not im-
ply their uniqueness. Nor does it imply formalized versions of G2 and
Lo¨b’s theorem (ϕ→ ϕ) ⊢ ϕ.
This shows that the move from diagonalized algebras in the sense of R. Mag-
ari, i.e., Boolean algebras with  satisfying Lo¨b’s conditions and having fixed
points, to diagonalizable algebras (modal algebras satisfying Lo¨b’s identity)
is, in general, not possible for logics without contraction and weakening. See
Smoryn´ski [18, 19] for a nice exposition of the original setup.
• One can also show that the admissibility of Lo¨b’s rule does not, in general,
imply a formalized version of G2.
A system S∗ witnessing this property can be obtained by extending the notion
of proof in the system S to possibly non-well-founded proof trees. Infinite proofs
may arise because of the presence of the fixed point rules. For S∗, unlike S, one
can show that Lo¨b’s rule is admissible. Yet, formalized G2 is still underivable.
The analysis of S∗ is based on another cut-admissibility theorem, which we
postpone to a later publication.
We remark that the system S does not provide a counterexample to the
non-formalized version of G2, since ⇒ ¬⊥ is not provable. We believe that
such a counterexample can be constructed by extending the language of S by an
operator similar to ! from linear logic and adding to S a fixed point of the form
a = ✸!a. However, a confirmation of this hypothesis is left for future work.
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